International Competition Rules for Private Business: A Trade Law Approach for Linking Trade and Competition Rules in the WTO - The Institutional and Jurisdictional Architecture by Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 72
Issue 2 Symposium on Global Competition and Public
Policy in an Era of Technological Integration
Article 15
December 1996
International Competition Rules for Private
Business: A Trade Law Approach for Linking Trade
and Competition Rules in the WTO - The
Institutional and Jurisdictional Architecture
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for Private Business: A Trade Law Approach for Linking Trade and Competition
Rules in the WTO - The Institutional and Jurisdictional Architecture, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 545 (1996).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol72/iss2/15
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION RULES FOR
GOVERNMENTS AND FOR PRIVATE BUSINESS: A
"TRADE LAW APPROACH" FOR LINKING
TRADE AND COMPETITION
RULES IN THE WTO
ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN*
International state practice has approached international compe-
tition problems from at least three different perspectives:
-The intellectual property law approach, notably in the 1883
Paris Convention on Protection of Industrial Property, has
focused one-sidedly on "effective protection against unfair
competition" (Article lObis) without providing for interna-
tional antitrust rules to protect freedom of competition and
consumer welfare (e.g., against market segmentation by
means of patent rights).
-The competition policy approach relies essentially on the ex-
traterritorial application of domestic competition laws (nota-
bly of the United States and EC) to anticompetitive practices
abroad and on legally nonbinding multilateral guidelines
(e.g., the 1980 UNCTAD Guidelines and 1986 OECD
Guidelines) and a few bilateral agreements for the coordina-
tion of domestic competition laws. Many national competi-
tion laws, however, provide for the exemption of export
cartels, import cartels or government-supported restraints of
competition, and the divergencies among national competi-
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national Cooperation and Rules" (EC Commission, 1995), as well as of the "Munich Group"
which published a "Draft International Antitrust Code" in 1993. This paper builds on, and sup-
plements, various earlier studies: ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, COMPETITION ELEMENTS IN IN-
TERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: A SURVEY AND SELECTIVE ANALYSIS (OECD 1994); ERNST-
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tion policies continue to generate international conflicts
(e.g., in the case of conflicting merger control policies or
"blocking statutes" in response to extraterritorial enforce-
ment of U.S. antitrust law).
-The trade law approach, notably in EC law and in the EC's
"Europe Agreements" with Eastern European countries, in-
tegrates trade and competition rules so as to protect interna-
tional market competition and cross-border transactions
against both governmental market access barriers (e.g., in fa-
vour of public undertakings and enterprises with privileged
positions) and private distortions (e.g., in the case of trade-
restricting patent misuse and anticompetitive licensing
agreements).
This Paper begins with a brief summary of the main arguments
why national and international competition among firms tends to be
welfare-increasing, provided there are no trade-distorting market fail-
ures and government failures, and why the worldwide trend towards
the strengthening of competition laws and policies is to be welcomed
(Sections I and II). Also international "competition among different
regulatory systems" is likely to be welfare-enhancing unless transna-
tional externalities or international public goods justify government in-
terventions (Section III). Section IV concludes that the existing
inconsistencies and "producer biases" of international trade law, intel-
lectual property law and competition laws can be overcome best by
integrating trade and competition rules in the framework of the World
Trade Organization ("WTO"). It recommends the establishment of a
WTO Committee on Trade and Competition at the WTO Ministerial
Conference in December 1996, in order to prepare such negotiations.
Section IV then discusses the 1995 EC Expert Group proposal for
a "Plurilateral Agreement on Competition and Trade" ("PACT"), as
well as the 1993 "Munich Draft" of an "International Antitrust Code,"
which were both designed as a "Plurilateral Agreement" in terms of
Annex 4 of the 1994 WTO Agreement. Section V illustrates the po-
tential "systemic advantages" of integrating competition rules into
GATT/WTO law by pointing to the many inconsistences between
trade and competition rules, such as the treatment regarding "preda-
tory pricing" in EC and U.S. antitrust laws, on the one side, and in
antidumping laws, on the other. Section VI concludes with the sug-
gestion that liberal trading countries should learn from the experience
of the "Tokyo Round" and "Uruguay Round package deal negotia-
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tions" by politically linking the various proposals for additional com-
petition, investment, and environmental rules to further reforms of
antidumping rules, whose protectionist biases and abuses impede in-
ternational trade and economic welfare in an arbitrary manner.
While the negotiation of these reforms will require years, initia-
tives for reducing the obvious inconsistencies between trade and com-
petition rules-such as protectionist antidumping practices, export
cartels, restrictive licensing agreements and other private market ac-
cess barriers-should not be delayed. The legitimate task of govern-
ments requires the promotion of the public interest, i.e., of the welfare
and equal rights of all domestic citizens, through nondiscriminatory
trade and competition rules. Governments must therefore resist pro-
tectionist pressures for redistributing consumer income for the benefit
of "rent-seeking" group interests by means of anticompetitive an-
tidumping practices, abuses of intellectual property rights (e.g., "pat-
ent misuse" in licensing contracts), and monopolistic market positions
(e.g., in telecommunication and transport markets).
I. NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY: WHY AND How?
A. Under What Conditions Is Market Competition Among Firms
Beneficial?
Competition emerges whenever individual freedoms and prop-
erty rights are protected so that people (homo economicus) can maxi-
mize their individual utility through division of labour, contracts, and
exchanges of property rights. Competition enhances individual liberty
and welfare in various ways: As a spontaneous information and dis-
covery mechanism, markets reveal individual preferences of consum-
ers and, through market prices, constantly process and convey
information on relative scarcities and supplies by producers and trad-
ers. As an allocation and coordination mechanism, competition pro-
motes the efficient allocation of scarce resources and coordinates
demand and supply in a manner maximizing freedom of choice, satis-
faction of consumer preferences, and individual responsibility. As an
income-distribution mechanism, market mechanisms reward produc-
tivity and innovation. Empirical research into the relationship be-
tween "economic freedom" and the economic growth of 102 countries
over the period 1975-1995 has confirmed that the more economic free-
19961
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dom a country has had, the more economic growth it achieved and the
richer its citizens became.'
TABLE 1: CONSUMERS' SURPLUS, PRODUCERS' SURPLUS, AND
DEADWEIGHT WELFARE Loss IN CASE OF
MONOPOLY POWER
Price
A
PM B
E
Pc=MC C
D
0Q Qc Quantity
Consumers' Surlus: measures consumer welfare by the excess
of social valuation of the product over the price actually paid
(= triangle ACPc)
Producers' Surplus: measures the transformation of consumers'
surplus into producers' profits in case of monopolistic prices
(= quadrangle PmBEPc)
Deadweip-ht Welfare Loss: measures the lost allocative
efficiency in case of monopoly prices
(= triangle BCE)
Yet, if market prices are distorted (e.g., through monopolies or
cartels) and do not reflect all production costs (e.g., due to "external
effects"), they are also likely to distort the allocation, coordination,
and distribution functions of market competition: consumer welfare
1. See ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 1975-1995 (J. Gwartney et al. eds., 1996). Of
course, the empirical correlation between economic freedom and wealth does not prove causa-
tion, and the measurement of governmental restrictions on "economic freedom" raises difficult
normative and empirical problems.
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will be reduced by higher prices, less products and fewer freedom of
choice; cartel members and monopolists will benefit from scarcity
rents at the expense of consumers; and economic efficiency will be
further diminished by "deadweight losses" (see Table 1). "Perfect
competition" would exist if no single supplier or consumer could influ-
ence the market price. This would require:
(a) rational behaviour of market participants (utility maximization);
(b) perfect information (e.g., no asymmetries in information);
(c) perfect mobility of the market ("atomistic competition" without
transaction costs).
(d) stable preferences and technologies; and
(e) reflection of all costs in the prices of goods and services (i.e.,
there are no externalities leading to a divergence of private and so-
cial costs, such as pollution externalities due to undervaluation of
environmental resources).
In reality, however, market competition is far from "perfect." As
a spofitaneous discovery mechanism, one major function of market
competition consists in reducing existing asymmetries in information
and in constantly processing data which, without market prices, might
be available only to a few individual market participants. Views
among economists on how competitive processes actually work, and
to what extent the rivalry between producers and consumers should
be regulated by governments, vary significantly. For instance, accord-
ing to the "structuralist school," market structure (i.e., the degree of
concentration) is the main determinant for market performance; mo-
nopoly is viewed as bad because it is likely to distort prices and the
efficient allocation of resources. Proponents of the "contestability
school," by contrast, focus on free entry to a market rather than on
market shares; as long as markets remain contestable, the potential
entry and competitive pressures of new competitors are likely to pre-
vent the monopolist from raising prices above the competitive level.
"Chicago school" economists view monopolies rather as a sign of su-
perior efficiency provided the monopoly is not due to governmental
barriers to market entry; as monopoly profits are likely to remain tem-
porary and to operate as an incentive for competitors to become more
efficient, their negative economic effects may be minimal.2
2. On the different schools of thought in antitrust economics see THE ArrIRusT
REVOLUTION: THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS (John E. Kwoka & Lawrence J. White eds., 1994); F.M.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (2d ed. 1990); WIL-
LIAM G. SHEPHERD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 1990).
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TABLE 2: ILUSTRATIVE LIST OF ANTICOMPETITIVE BUSINESS
PRACTICES REGULATED BY COMPETITION POLICY
HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS: "Hard core cartels" among firms in an oligopolis-
tic market (e.g., on price fixing, output restrictions, market division, customer
allocation, and collusive tendering) and other anticompetitive cooperation
between firms selling competing products. While "naked" cartels tend to be
prohibited, the anti- and procompetitive effects of other horizontal coopera-
tion need to be balanced (e.g., based on a "rule of reason," individual exemp-
tions or group exemptions).
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS: Distribution strategies between manufacturers, sup-
pliers, or distributors such as tying (the sale of one good is conditioned on the
purchase of another good), exclusive dealing (the seller requires the buyer to
purchase products only from the seller), territorial restraints (the seller
requires the buyer/distributor to resell the product within a limited geograph-
ical area), and resale price maintenance (the seller requires the buyer to
resell the product only at a specified price). While resale price-fixing tends to
be generally prohibited, the pro- and anticompetitive effects of other vertical
restraints need to be evaluated (e.g., misuse control). 6
ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: Technology licensing arrange-
ments abusing the monopoly-like position of IPR holders e.g., through non-
competition clauses (e.g. "grantback": the licensee is required to assign
inventions made in the course of working the transferred technology back to
the licensor) or noncontestation clauses (the licensee is prevented from con-
testing the validity of the IPR or other rights of the licensor). IPR abuses
might be subject to the general competition rules on horizontal and vertical
restraints.
ABUSES OF MARKET DOMINANCE: Dominant firms accounting for a signifi-
cant market share (e.g., of forty percent or more) may attempt to monopolize
a market, e.g., through excess prices, price discrimination, predatory low
prices, refusal to deal, or vertical restraints. Rules against the abuse of a dom-
inant position may be conduct-oriented (e.g., a general prohibition against
monopolizing and foreclosure of competition) or result-oriented (e.g., prohi-
bition of predatory pricing only if the losses can be recouped).
MERGERS AND ACQUISITION POLICIES: Horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate
mergers may reduce competition or increase efficiency. Merger policies may
be designed to ensure the contestability of markets by preventing a monop-
oly (price-setting by a single seller), monopsony (price-setting by a single
buyer), or oligopolistic market power. But acquisition policies may also be
used for industrial policy purposes.
PUBLIC UNDERTAKINGS AND ENTERPRISES WITH SPECIAL PRIVILEGES: In
view of their market power (e.g., financial independence), they may be
required to behave according to market principles (Article XVII GATT,
Article 90 EC). Exclusive trading rights and monopolies may be prohibited
(Article 37 EC).
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B. Why Do Countries Need a Competition Policy?
Also, imperfect competition is important (e.g., as a spontaneous
discovery, information, and coordination mechanism). But it may pro-
duce suboptimal results in case of market failures, such as abuse of
market power, information asymmetries, external effects, inadequate
protection of property rights, and insufficient supply of public goods
(such as clean air) due to their "nonexcludability" and nonrivalrous
"joint consumption." The goals of "market contestability" and undis-
torted competition require therefore a governmental competition pol-
icy designed to prevent market failures (such as abuses of market
power, cartels, anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions) and to pro-
mote public goods.
But economists and policy-makers often disagree on the optimal
policy instruments for promoting competition (cf. Table 2). In contrast
to the present worldwide consensus of governments and economists
on the legal and economic ranking of trade policy instruments which
discriminate against foreign products in favour of domestic products
(see Table 3), there is no similar consensus on the optimal instruments
of domestic competition, investment, or environmental policies, apart
from the GATT requirement of "national treatment" of imported and
"like" domestic products. This is illustrated by the GATT rules (e.g.,
in Articles III and VI) authorizing unilateral antidumping measures,
countervailing duties or other "border adjustment measures" if for-
eign dumping practices, subsidies, or divergent foreign product regula-
tions cause injury to producers or consumers in the importing country.
But GATT rules do not require such countermeasures or border ad-
justment measures; and most economists emphasize that a "thank-you
note" might be the most efficient response to dumped, subsidized, or
otherwise low-priced imports which benefit domestic consumers with-
out endangering competition or other "public goods." The GATT re-
quirements of unconditional most-favoured-nation treatment (Article
1:1) and national treatment (Article III) prohibit to make the non-
discriminatory access to the domestic market conditional on compli-
ance with the production regulations of the importing country.
If governments intervene to correct market failures or supply
public goods, the risks of market failure have to be weighed against
the risks of alternative government failure, for example, when govern-
ment interventions lead to additional distortions. National competi-
tion laws and policies differ among countries, for instance regarding
the use of per-se-prohibitions (e.g., of horizontal cartels and certain
1996]
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TABLE 3: THE PUBLIC CHOICE OF TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Political Ranking
Instruments of Economic Ranking (Parliamentary Legal Ranking
Import Protection (Efficiency) Control) (GATT)
Border adjustment
measures for non-
discriminatory
internal taxes and
regulations
Production subsidy
Import tariff
Import restrictions
- global quota
- country quotas
Voluntary export
restraints (VER)
Optimal instrument
for correcting
domestic distortions
First best (production
distortion)
Second best (produc-
tion and consump-
tion distortion)
Third best (additional
distortions of price
competition; pri-
vate protection
rents in lieu of
tariff revenue; legal
insecurity)
Fourth best (addi-
tional transfers of
quota rents abroad,
additional legal
insecurity)
Nondiscriminatory
measures subject to
legislation
Direct budgetary
transfers subject to
legislation
Transparent taxes,
goverment revenue
and protection
rents subject to
legislation
Less transparent,
administrative dis-
tribution of market
shares and proec-
tion rents to
importers and for-
eign exporters
Nontransparent trans-
fers of protection
rents at home and
abroad without
parliamentary and
judicial control
Allowed (note to
Art. III GATT)
and not subject to
countermeasures
Allowed but possibly
"countervailable"
and "actionable"
(Arts. VI, XVI:I.
XXIII GATT and
1994 Subsidy
Code)
Allowed subject to
tariff bindings
(Arts. II, XXVIII)
and safeguard
clauses (e.g., Arts.
VI, XIX)
Prohibited subject to
GATT's safequard
clauses (e.g., Arts.
XI, XII, XVIII-
XXI) and non-dis-
crimination
requirements (e.g.,
Arts. XIII, XX)
Prohibited (Art. XIII
GAT) with only
temporary excep-
tions (1994 Safe-
guards and Textiles
Agreements)
vertical restraints) and of rules-of-reason with rebuttable presump-
tions (e.g., for abuses of market power) or requirements to balance
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects (e.g., of mergers). The in-
stitutional frameworks of national competition laws (e.g., more pri-
vate lawsuits before trial courts and less administrative investigations
in the United States than in the EC), the available legal remdies (e.g.,
civil claims of "treble damages" and criminal sanctions in the United
States, but not in the EC, in addition to "cease and desist" orders),
and the effective enforcement of the "law in the books" also vary con-
siderably among jurisdictions. Some small economies, like Hong Kong
and Singapore, have even refrained from adopting competition laws
[Vol. 72:545
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on the ground that their liberal trade policies are a sufficient guaran-
tee of the "contestability" of their open economies.
II. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY: WHY AND How?
A. Why Do Governments Need International Rules on
"Competition Among Governments"?
Domestic and international competition among firms differ in var-
ious respects (e.g., immobility of the national territory, less interna-
tional mobility of capital and labour, different monetary, and legal
systems). National, as well as international, competition among firms
is influenced not only by "natural" production factor endowments but
also by government-determined conditions of competition. National
legal and economic systems can be viewed as created factor endow-
ments that can affect, positively or negatively, a state's competitive-
ness in international trade. For instance, the fact that the average per
capita income of Singapore increased from about $500 in 1965 to more
than $25,000 in 1995, whereas the per capita income of some African
developing countries stagnated during the same thirty-year period,
seems in large part due to the respective government policies. Na-
tional rule systems compete among each other with regard to mobile
production factors (e.g., scarce international capital, investments,
technology) and production costs for traded goods and services. Due
to different national factor endowments and preferences, every state
has a different regulatory optimum.
Similar to competition among firms, international competition
among governments also is likely to maximize information and mutual
learning (competition as a discovery process), freedom of choice, a
more efficient allocation of scarce resources, and technological inno-
vation (e.g., due to "voting by feet" as an incentive for reducing na-
tional government failures). Likewise, market failures at the national
or international level, such as cross-border pollution and inadequate
protection of property rights in environmental resources, may also dis-
tort international competition among governments by misallocating
productive resources. There are also concerns that "competition
among rules" may trigger a "race to the bottom" and a suboptimal
level of lax rules (e.g., similar to the "Delaware problem" concerning
fiscal and other competition within the United States). Hence the pol-
icy questions, long since discussed in European integration and in-
creasingly also in the preparations for the future work programme of
the WTO: Which regulatory differences among countries should be
19961
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accepted as legitimate? Which ones call for international harmoniza-
tion of rules? May, similar to abuses of market power in competition
among firms, regulatory competition among governments be distorted
also by the dominance of large trading countries?
Economic theory teaches that market competition may be dis-
torted and lead to suboptimal results if there are market failures or
governmental "intervention failures" to correct existing market imper-
fections. Regulatory competition therefore also requires rules on com-
petition among governments, similar to antitrust rules on competition
among firms. Competition among governments can help governments
in their efforts to attract mobile production factors and to meet citi-
zens' interests effectively (e.g., by maximizing consumer welfare
through liberal trade and an optimal level of public goods), to resist
protectionist pressures by "rent-seeking" interest groups. The limits of
international regulatory competition may be determined by analogy
to the theory of market failure.
Thus, international regulatory competition cannot be relied upon
in the case of international public goods, or when new property rights
have to be established in order to protect "global commons" and to
internalize transfrontier pollution. But as long as there are no transna-
tional external effects (including abuses of power and under-supply of
international public goods), differences among national rules may be
justified in view of different national factor endowments and prefer-
ences. Even if there are cross-border market failures, they must be
weighed against the risks of alternative government failures, including
international harmonization of national rules in disregard of divergent
national factor endowments.
B. Which Regulatory Differences Among Countries Are "Unfair
Distortions" That Justify International Harmonization?
As indicated above, international regulatory competition among
firms and among governments is likely to be suboptimal only if there
are cross-border externalities or international public goods. Theoreti-
cally, "unfair regulatory differences" could be defined as those result-
ing from market failures or government failures with transnational
trade-distorting effects. In practical terms, however, it will often be
impossible to challenge-in objective terms-one government's per-
ception of "market failure," of the need for corrective government
interventions, and of the supply of "public goods." As explained
above, traditional economic theory often does not offer precise guide-
lines for identifying "government failures" (e.g., preventing alleged
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"eco-dumping") and for evaluating the political trade-offs (e.g., the
opportunity costs of higher national environmental standards). Hence,
views among sovereign states on how to distinguish "legitimate com-
parative advantages" from "unfair regulatory differences," may legiti-
mately differ.
1. International "External Effects"
As regards external effects, it appears useful to divide them into
"nonfinancial externalities" (such as cross-border pollution) and "fi-
nancial externalities" (such as the lower production costs and competi-
tive benefits due to lower environmental standards). Whether lower
production standards, wages, or exchange rates of one country are
tantamount to "market failures" or "government failures," and there-
fore confer "unfair pecuniary advantages" on its industries competing
with producers in other countries, should be decided on the basis of
the agreed multilateral subsidy and trade rules notably in WTO and
EC law. Outside these agreed multilateral rules for financial contribu-
tions by a government for the benefit of specific industries, generally
available "regulatory subsidies" and their international "pecuniary ex-
ternalities" (operating through changes in market prices) are not "ac-
tionable" under WTO law and, especially if they benefit foreign
consumers, do not justify foreign countermeasures. According to the
economic theory of optimal intervention, national market failures or
government failures should be corrected directly at their source
through national measures. International countermeasures are, at
best, suboptimal instruments for the correction of market failures or
government failures abroad and for the limitation of their transna-
tional external effects. As governments will tend to reject foreign
claims of "unfair" market failures or government failures, the costs
and risks of politicized, power-oriented foreign "aggressive unilateral-
ism" are likely to be much higher than their alleged benefits.
As regards nonfinancial externalities, such as cross-border pollu-
tion, general international law permits proportionate countermeasures
by adversely affected states. But international treaty law (such as
GATT/WTO law) may limit the range of permissible countermeasures
(e.g., the use of trade sanctions). Economic theory confirms that trade
sanctions by an importing country are hardly ever an efficient policy
instrument for "internalizing" pollution externalities at the production
level in the exporting country, for, apart from the rare case that the
polluter sells all his products abroad in the importing country, the im-
1996]
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port restrictions will not prevent the polluter from continuing his pro-
duction and selling the products elsewhere.
2. International "Public Goods"
If "international public goods" are not defined through interna-
tional treaties, unilateral claims that foreign rules (e.g., on the fishing
of tuna) are unfairly endangering international public goods (e.g., dol-
phins in the High Seas) are likely to give rise to controversies among
governments and to difficulties of distinguishing "fair" and "unfair"
regulatory advantages among sovereign countries. International trea-
ties (such as GATTI/WTO law) often include generous safeguard
clauses permitting unilateral measures for the protection of national
public goods (e.g., human, animal, or plant life and health in the im-
porting country). But these safeguard clauses, and the unconditional
most-favoured-nation treatment and national treatment obligations in
GATI/WTO law, also imply legal obligations to respect the equal pol-
icy autonomy of member countries. As rightly emphasized in a
number of GATT dispute settlement reports, 3 they limit the right of
importing countries to make the access to their market conditional on
changes in the domestic policies of exporting countries. The border
adjustment rules in GATT Article III only allow to exempt exports
from, and to subject imports to, nondiscriminatory product taxes and
product regulations for domestic "like products." Yet, GAT-/WTO
law does not allow to make access to the domestic market conditional
on compliance of foreign producers with the process and production
standards ("PPMs") in the importing country unless such PPMs are
"product-related" as defined in the WTO Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade.
The preceding discussion suggests that even if transnational ex-
ternalities and international public goods call for international coordi-
nation of divergent national PPMs, governments still can choose
among alternative policy instruments. These may differ considerably
as regards the flexibility which they leave to national law-makers. For
instance, nondiscriminatory border adjustment measures permitted
under Article III of GATT and mutual recognition of equivalent na-
tional standards allow more flexibility than full international harmoni-
zation of national rules. Also, "aggressive unilateralism" to induce
other countries to change their domestic policies may be more trade-
3. Notably in the "Tuna I" and "Tuna II" GATT panel reports of 1991 and 1994. Cf.
ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND 22, 122 (1995).
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distorting than discriminatory trade measures against foreign products
based on multilaterally agreed rules (e.g., in case of countervailing du-
ties on subsidized imports causing injury to import-competing domes-
tic producers).
III. INTERNATIONAL RULES FOR "COMPETITION AMONG
GOVERNMENTS": PROMOTION OF REGULATORY
COMPETITION THROUGH GATT/WTO LAW
As explained above, international competition among different
regulatory systems may be suboptimal in case of transnational exter-
nalities and international public goods. Hence, there is a need for in-
ternational rules in order to avoid such transnational "market
failures" and "government failures" in intergovernmental relations,
similar to the need for competition rules to avoid private market fail-
ures in private markets. In the following, cross-border pollution-as
one case of transnational market failure (externalities) as well as of
government failure (state responsibility for cross-border pollution)-
is used as an example for analyzing more precisely whether the legal
distinctions in GATr/WTO law (1) between PPMs, and (2) between
national public goods (protected by GATT Article XX) and interna-
tional public goods (protected, e.g., by GATT Articles XXIII and
XXV), are consistent with the above-mentioned policy recommenda-
tions derived from economic theory.
A. Are the Legal Distinctions in GATT/WTO Law between Product
Standards and Process and Production Standards
Consistent with Economic Theory?
The rules of GATT, such as the most-favoured-nation treatment
(Article I) and national treatment requirements (Article III), primar-
ily aim at the reduction of market access barriers for traded products,
without limiting the sovereign freedom of GATT member countries
with regard to their domestic policies (e.g., national PPMs and compe-
tition policies). The border adjustment rules in GATT Article III (as
clarified by the interpretative note to Article III) allow to extend non-
discriminatory internal environmental product taxes or other environ-
mental product-related regulations to imported products so as to pre-
vent or "internalize" consumption externalities in the importing
country (e.g., health risks and environmental harm). Moreover,
GATT's border adjustment rules also allow exemption of export
goods from such product taxes or product regulations in the exporting
country based on the assumption that the exported goods will be sub-
1996]
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ject to the product taxes and product regulations in the importing
country ("destination principle"). 4
By contrast, GATT's border adjustment rules do not subject im-
ported products to domestic PPMs because PPMs are directed against
production externalities, which should be addressed directly at the
source in the country of production. As production factor endow-
ments and environmental absorption capacities differ from country to
country, different PPMs in the exporting country do not justify trade
restrictions in the importing country. GATT's border adjustment rules
are therefore widely considered to be consistent with economic
theory.
B. Are the Legal Distinctions in GATT/WTO Law Between
National and International Public Goods Consistent with
Economic Theory? WTO Surveillance of
Domestic Policy Autonomy.
The freedom of each GATT member country to decide on its do-
mestic regulations (Article III) and on the level of its import tariffs
(Articles II, XXVIII), and to apply safeguard measures against injuri-
ous imports (Articles VI, XIX, XX), enables each country to protect
national public goods such as a "conservative welfare function" to
protect import-competing industries against wide-spread unemploy-
ment caused by low-priced imports. These GATT rules clearly recog-
nize the right of each country to accord more importance to the
protection of legitimate national public goods other than liberal trade.
But GATIT's unconditional most-favoured-nation treatment obliga-
tion also requires respect for the equal domestic policy autonomy of
other GATT member countries; it therefore prohibits PPM-based
countermeasures discriminating against foreign products if such coun-
termeasures are only designed to raise the costs of foreign producers
benefiting from lower foreign PPMs, or to facilitate political support
in the importing country for higher domestic PPMs.
The WTO Agreement explicitly recognizes (e.g., in its preamble)
the need to protect environmental resources and to promote "sustain-
4. On GATT's border adjustment rules see notably Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic
Policies and Multilateral Trade Integration, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUI-
SITES FOR FREE TRADE? 21, 23 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996), who rightly
notes that GATT's border adjustment rules leave four options: (1) exempt taxes on products
exported from country A to B (taxation in the country of destination); (2) tax exported goods in
the country of exportation and exempt them from taxation in the country of importation; (3)
double taxation in the countries of exportation and importation; and (4) tax exemptions in both
the countries of exportation and importation.
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able development." But, as there are legitimate reasons for diversity
in environmental regulation across countries and trade restrictions are
no efficient policy instrument for dealing with pollution at the produc-
tion or consumption level, GATTIWTO law does not explicitly au-
thorize departures from GATT/WTO law so as to protect
international environmental resources outside the national jurisdiction.
WTO member countries remain, however, free to protect themselves
against transnational pollution caused by low environmental PPMs
abroad. They may also grant waivers (e.g., under GAT Article
XXV), or conclude multilateral environmental agreements
("MEAs"), authorizing departures from the general GATT/WTO
rules so as to protect "global commons" through trade-related envi-
ronmental measures ("TREMs"). In the absence of transnational ex-
ternalities and mutually-agreed international public goods, economic
theory suggests (as indicated above) that international regulatory
competition is likely to operate as a spontaneous discovery and coor-
dination mechanism for inducing countries to apply efficent PPMs.
The "domestic policy autonomy" of WTO member countries is
based on the political and economic assumption that differences be-
tween environmental PPMs across countries may be legitimate for
many reasons (such as different environmental resource endowments,
absorption capacities, preferences and opportunity costs). The "sover-
eign equality" of countries implies not only the right to decide on
one's own national environmental standards, as long as they do not
cause spillover effects on other countries. It also implies the right to
have recourse to the WTO dispute settlement system if foreign
TREMs are unnecessarily trade-restrictive or discriminatory. Similar
to federal and regional free trade systems, the WTO world trade and
legal system requires such a dispute settlement mechanisms so as to
protect member countries against discriminatory, unnecessary or
otherwise disguised restrictions of trade, which are prohibited in the
WTO Agreements of Technical Barriers to Trade and on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Standards. The WTO dispute settlement system also
prohibits unilateral trade sanctions. Outside the scope of GATI/WTO
law, governments dispose of more efficient alternative "carrots and
sticks" if they want to induce foreign governments to raise their PPM
standards and to join MEAs. The various WTO mechanisms for multi-
lateral surveillance of domestic policy autonomy are thus a necessary
procedural complement to the substantive WTO rules on domestic
policy autonomy and on "competition among governments."
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C. GATT's Trade Law Approach: Why GATT's Focus on
Governmental Market Access Barriers Is Justified
Two characteristic features of GATT law, and of the successive
"GATT Rounds" of multilateral trade negotiations, have been the pri-
ority given to the liberalization of governmental market access barri-
ers, and the progressive extension of the scope of GATT rules not
only to all trade policy instruments (i.e., government measures discrim-
inating against imports or exports), but also to internal policy instru-
ments (such as nondiscriminatory technical regulations and
standards). This GAIT approach, and the WTO as a negotiating fo-
rum for future negotiations on the reciprocal liberalization of govern-
mental market access barriers, continues to deserve priority for at
least two reasons:
(a) Government-supported market access barriers appear
relatively more important than private market access barri-
ers. Hence, the gains from further liberalization of tariffs,
nontariff border measures, technical regulations and stan-
dards, rules of origin, contingent protection like antidumping
and countervailing duties, government procurement, subsi-
dies, etc., are likely to be higher than gains from additional
international competition rules for private restraints of com-
petition. There remains a lot of "unfinished business" re-
garding the liberalization of these and other governmental
market access barriers and distortions.
(b) The political economy of GATT negotiations (e.g., reci-
procity, package deals, most-favoured-nation and national-
treatment requirements, GATT dispute settlement, and en-
forcement procedures) has enabled "free-riding" to be over-
come, and reforms to be achieved that had never been
possible in previous sectoral negotiations outside GATT, for
example on substantive intellectual property rights stan-
dards, competition rules, and dispute settlement mechanisms
in the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"),
or on "positive comity" requirements and deregulation of in-
ternational services in the OECD. The GATT/WTO offers a
much more favourable negotiating forum for overcoming
protectionist resistance to reforms of trade, competition and
intellectual property laws than other worldwide international
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organizations. 5 Legal and political reasons suggest that the
"interface problems" between governmental and private an-
ticompetitive practices may be overcome, if at all, only in the
context of the GATI/WTO system.
D. The New "WTO Approach": Broader and Integrated Market
Access Guarantees for Goods, Services, Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Rights and Investments
The WTO differs from the GATT approach by focusing on
broader and integrated market access guarantees. Many WTO provi-
sions explicitly deal with private market access barriers, albeit in an
imperfect manner. This broader WTO approach corresponds better to
the globalization of production and markets and helps internationally
active enterprises to choose between alternative "export strategies,"
"foreign investment strategies," and "licensing strategies" based on in-
tellectual property rights. It offers additional opportunities for pro-
moting economic welfare and liberty through reciprocal "package
deal negotiations" in the WTO. More systematic and more compre-
hensive WTO rules on private anticompetitive practices in goods
trade, services trade, and intellectual property are explicitly called for
in many WTO rules as a necessary complement to the existing WTO
law.
The broader market access guarantees in WTO law increase the
international contestability of markets and the relative importance of
the remaining private market access barriers. This is reflected in a
large number of provisions in WTO law explicitly addressing private
anticompetitive practices. For instance:
(a) The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade includes
detailed rules designed to ensure that the preparation, adop-
tion, and application of technical regulations, standards and
conformity assessment procedures by nongovernmental bod-
ies are not more trade-restrictive than necessary (e.g., Arti-
cles 3, 4, and 8).
(b) The Agreement on Preshipment Inspection prescribes
rules for the activities of private preshipment inspection enti-
ties (e.g., Article 2).
5. For an explanation of this argument, and a detailed analysis of the Uruguay Round
negotiations from the point of view of "public choice" and negotiation theories, see Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, The Transformation of the World Trading System through the 1994 Agreement Es-
tablishing the World Trade Organization, 6 EUR. J. INT'L LAW 161 (1995).
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(c) The Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII
of GATT 1994 provides for increased surveillance of state
trading enterprises or enterprises with exclusive or special
privileges through strengthened notification and review
procedures.
(d) The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI regulates
private injurious dumping and price undertakings in more de-
tail and refers, e.g., to "trade restrictive practices and compe-
tition" as relevant factors in the determination of injury
(Article 3.5).
(e) The Agreement on Subsidies regulates "market displace-
ment," "price undercutting," and "voluntary undertakings" by
exporters in more detail (e.g., Articles 6, 18) and also re-
quires the examination of "trade restrictive practices and
competition" in determinations of "injury" (Article 15).
(f) The Agreement on Safeguards prohibits "voluntary export
restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other simi-
lar measures on the export or the import side", including
"compulsory import cartels... which afford protection" (Ar-
ticle 11). Member states are required "not to encourage or
support the adoption or maintenance by public and private
enterprises" of equivalent nongovernmental measures (Arti-
cle 11:3).
(g) The General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS")
includes rules designed to ensure that "monopolies and ex-
clusive service suppliers" (Article VIII) do not nullify or im-
pair obligations and commitments under the GATS. It also
recognizes that other anti-competitive business practices of
service suppliers "may restrain competition and thereby
trade in services" (Article IX). Much of what governments
are negotiating in the on-going GATS market access negotia-
tions (e.g., on telecommunications) consists of commitments
to control monopolistic abuses of dominant market positions
by existing services suppliers (e.g., of telephone, telex, fax,
video and other postal services, radio, TV and satellite mo-
nopolies). Some of the GATS market access commitments
therefore amount to an internationalization of competition
policy. These "specific commitments" (cf Articles XVI-
XVIII of GATS), and the most-favoured-nation and reci-
procity requirements of the GATS, may, in turn, also in-
[Vol. 72:545
TRADE AND COMPETITION RULES IN THE WTO
crease the need for developing more general competition
rules.
(h) The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPS") includes "unfair trade rules" (e.g., in Arti-
cle 17 on exceptions for the "fair use" of trademarks, Arti-
cles 22-24 on "misleading" or "unfair" uses of geographical
indications, and Article 39 on protection of undisclosed in-
formation "against unfair commercial use") as well as anti-
trust rules dealing with restraints of competition so as to
ensure "that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legiti-
mate trade" (Preamble). The latter competition rules reflect
the general tension between the protection of intellectual
property rights as a precondition of market competition (e.g.,
for the allocation, transfer, and further development of in-
dustrial property, competition between individual rights) and
the potential restraints of competition as a result of too far-
reaching protection of exclusive intellectual property rights
(e.g., in the case of monopolistic patent misuse). 6 But the
TRIPS provisions on the delimitation of "legitimate trade"
and "abuse of intellectual property rights"-notably in Article
8 on the protection of the "public interest" against "practices
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the in-
ternational transfer of technology," Article 31 on patent uses
without authorization of the right holder so as "to correct
anticompetitive practices," and Article 40 on anticompetitive
licensing practices-are incomplete in many respects (e.g.,
Article 6 which deliberately does not "address the issue of
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights"). Not only de-
veloping countries with underdeveloped national competi-
tion and intellectual property rights laws, but also developed
countries will need more systematic rules on the protection
of competition among trade-related intellectual property
rights and on the prevention of their anticompetitive abuse.
As in domestic competition laws, such international competi-
tion rules should form part of an international competition
agreement applicable to the various fields of WTO law.7
6. See, e.g., W. Fikentscher, Wettbewerbsrecht im TRIPS-Agreement der Welthandelsor-
ganisation, in GRUR INTERNATIONAL 529 (1995).
7. See A. Heinemann, Das Kartellrecht des geistigen Eigentums im TRIPS-Obereinkommen
der Welthandelsorganisation, in GRUR INTERNATIONAL 535 (1995).
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(i) The Agreement on Government Procurement regulates
tendering procedures so as to "ensure optimum effective in-
ternational competition" and "equitable opportunities for
suppliers or service providers" (e.g., Article X). It also refers
to certain competition problems (such as collusive tendering
and "absence of competition," cf Article XV) and provides
for "procedures enabling suppliers and service providers to
challenge alleged breaches of the Agreement arising in the
context of procurements in which they have, or have had, an
interest" (Article XX).
In addition to this increasing number of WTO provisions regulat-
ing private anticompetitive practices, the WTO Agreement also in-
cludes several mandates to examine the competition policy aspects of
other trade provisions. For instance:
(a) Article 9 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures requires the WTO Council on Trade in Goods to
"review the operation of this Agreement and . . . consider
whether it should be complemented with provisions on in-
vestment policy and competition policy." This provision was
included at the request of less-developed countries to meet
their concern that governmental trade-related investment
measures may be necessary in order to counter anticompeti-
tive practices of multinational enterprises.
(b) Review provisions are also included in other WTO
Agreements regulating private anticompetitive practices
(e.g., Article 6 of the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection)
and may provide a basis for future negotiations on additional
competition rules.
(c) The accession of Russia, China and other former state-
trading countries to the WTO will also make evident that-
without more effective competition rules for enterprises with
"exclusive or special privileges" (Article XVII of GATT)-
many GATT and GATS commitments are easy to circum-
vent through governmental toleration of dominant market
positions and other private anticompetitive practices.
(d) The GATS explicitly recognizes "that certain business
practices of services suppliers . . . may restrain competition
and thereby restrict trade in services" (Article IX). This may
lead to future negotiations on "specific commitments" on the
liberalization of such private anticompetitive practices. The
various Annexes to the GATS-such as the Annexes on Fi-
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nancial Services, Telecommunications, Air Transport and
Maritime Transport Services-set out framework rules for
the progressive liberalization of services trade through future
negotiations that are likely to succeed only if they liberalize
and restrict the numerous monopolies and private anti-com-
petitive practices in these fields (e.g., bilateral market-sharing
agreements for air and maritime transports).
(e) The TRIPS Agreement explicitly recognizes that "appro-
priate measures ... may be needed to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to
practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely af-
fect the international transfer of technology" (Article 8:2).
Since the significance and legal scope of the TRIPS Agree-
ment may depend on what competition rules member coun-
tries will adopt so as to ensure "effective protection against
unfair competition" (Article 39) and control of "anti-com-
petitive practices" (Article 40), the negotiation of agreed
minimum standards for such competition rules is bound to
become an important subject in the implementation of the
TRIPS Agreement.
IV. RECENT PROPOSALS FOR NEGOTIATING ADDITIONAL
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION RULES IN THE WTO 8
A. Need for Additional WTO Competition Rules: Legal, Political,
and Economic Reasons
The conclusion from the preceding sections is that the WTO-not
only with regard to its "constitutional function" as a code of conduct
for government policies, but also for its additional functions as a Trade
Policy Review Mechanism, Dispute Settlement Body and Negotiating
Forum for new rules9-requires a more systematic and more consis-
tent approach to competition policy problems. For instance:
(a) In GATT/WTO practice, the market access rules of
GAT/VWTO law are construed rather strictly as competition
rules designed to protect nondiscriminatory conditions of
competition. For instance, violations of GATT rules with po-
tentially adverse effects on conditions of competition are
presumed to cause "nullification or impairment" of treaty
8. For earlier proposals and comparative legal aspects see the studies cited supra note 1.
9. On these different functions of GATT and the WTO see Petersmann, supra note 5, at
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benefits regardless of whether actual trade damage has al-
ready occurred. In view of the successful liberalization of tar-
iffs and trade policy border measures, it is only logical to
progressively extend the scope of GATr/WTO law to inter-
nal policy instruments and to private market access barriers.
(b) Both GATT law and the GATS explicitly recognize, and
the increasing number of complaints (e.g., the 1995 U.S. and
EC complaints concerning access to the Japanese markets for
automobiles, automobile parts and mobile telephony) and of
GATTIWTO dispute settlement proceedings against private
market access barriers confirms, that the competitive benefits
from GAT/WTO rules may be "nullified or impaired" by
private market access barriers. GATT/WTO rules could be
made more effective by a systematic recognition of these in-
terrelationships in WTO law (e.g., in Article XVII of GATT
and Article IX of GATS). This can be achieved more effec-
tively through conduct-oriented competition rules than
merely through general result-oriented obligations that the
competitive benefits deriving from GATr/WTO law must
not be "nullified or impaired" through private market access
barriers.' 0
(c) Over the past decades, it has not been possible to over-
come many of the "protectionist biases" of the world trading
system through sectoral negotiations, e.g., among air trans-
port authorities in the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion, among shipping authorities in the International
Maritime Organization, among competition authorities
within the OECD, or among intellectual property right bu-
reaucracies within WIPO. Thus, the widespread cartel ar-
rangements in the international agreements on international
air and shipping transports, the lack of competition rules in
the various WIPO conventions on protection of intellectual
property rights, and/or the widespread exemptions for export
10. Article 46:1 of the 1948 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization al-
ready required that "[elach member shall take appropriate measures and shall cooperate with
the Organization to prevent, on the part of private or public commercial enterprises, business
practices affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit access to markets, or
foster monopolistic control, whenever such practices have harmful effects on the expansion of
production or trade and interfere with the achievement of any of the nother objectives set forth
in Article 1." This general obligation was then illustrated by a list of such restrictive business
practices, which left it to both the ITO and individual member states to further specify the con-
tents of the general obligation on a case-by-case basis.
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and import cartels in domestic competition laws continue to
impede and distort the worldwide division of labour. Nor
could substantive reforms of the protectionist biases of an-
tidumping laws be achieved through GATT negotiations
among self-interested antidumping bureaucrats. Only more
comprehensive, reciprocal "package deal negotiations," such
as future "WTO Rounds," are likely to attract the political
support from heads of governments, as well as from export
industries, which is necessary for overcoming protectionist
pressures for anticompetitive rules on trade, competition and
intellectual property. The focus of competition law on gen-
eral consumer welfare will assist in limiting the arbitrary
"producer bias" of antidumping laws and protectionist
abuses of intellectual property rights.
(d) The WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism already cov-
ers competition policies and intellectual property rights pro-
tection in member countries. It should be used more
systematically for examining the manifold interface problems
of trade and competition policies.
(e) The negotiation of additional competition rules in the
context of the WTO has been suggested as one of the sub-
jects for the future WTO Work Programme. The 1996 WTO
Ministerial Conference should set up a WTO Committee on
Trade and Competition to examine the interrelationships be-
tween WTO rules and competition problems, and the need
for negotiating additional WTO rules on competition policies
and private market access barriers. The experience with the
WTO Committee on Trade and Environment suggests that
such a systematic examination of the interface problems of
trade and competition policies can contribute to clarifying
the problems and the interpretation of the WTO rules, and
can facilitate future negotiations on additional W'TO rules.
(f) Trade liberalization, deregulation and the worldwide
adoption of market-based approaches have led to an increas-
ing interdependence of production and markets in different
countries through trade in goods, services and cross-border
movements of persons, capital and technology. The Uruguay
Round Agreements acknowledge these interrelationships be-
tween goods trade, services, know-how transfers and direct
investments by extending the legal market access guarantees
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beyond trade in goods to services trade, investments and in-
tellectual property rights. The new and broader market ac-
cess guarantees reduce transaction costs and distortions of
complementary international business activities and have im-
portant implications for transnational enterprises. Not only
should governments reexamine and broaden their competi-
tion policies but internationally active enterprises should also
reexamine their alternative "internationalization strategies"
(e.g., exports, licensing, and/or direct investments) and
should support additional market access guarantees against
private anticompetitive restraints.
B. The 1995 EC Expert Group Report on "Competition Policy in
the New Trade Order: Strengthening International
Cooperation Rules"'1
The Report begins with a number of reasons why the worldwide
trade liberalization and globalization of business call for a strengthen-
ing of domestic competition laws, of their effective enforcement and
of cooperation among competition authorities. For instance:
-The lack of national competition laws, or their ineffective
enforcement, in more than 100 countries gives rise to market
access barriers, concerns over reciprocity, trade conflicts and
retaliatory trade sanctions.
-There are more and more competition problems which tran-
scend national boundaries: international cartels, export car-
tels, restrictive practices in fields which are international by
nature (such as air and sea transport), mergers on a world-
wide scale, or the abuse of a dominant position in several
major markets (e.g., the 1994 Microsoft case).
-The differences and risks of conflict among domestic compe-
tition rules (e.g., in the case of a merger or concerted prac-
tice being authorized in one country and prohibited in
another) generate uncertainty and transaction costs.
-The unilateral extra-territorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust
laws and trade laws vis-A-vis foreign anticompetitive prac-
11. Mandated and published by the EC Commission: EUROPEAN COMMISSION
COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW TRADE ORDER: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION AND RULES (1995). The Expert Group was composed of three external experts
(U. Immenga, F. Jenny, E.-U. Petersmann) and six EC Commission officials acting in a personal
capacity (C.-D. Ehlermann, J.F. Pons, R. Abbott, F. Lamoureux, J.F. Marchipont, A.
Jacquemin).
[Vol. 72:545
TRADE AND COMPETITION RULES IN THE WTO
tices leads to international conflicts (e.g., over jurisdiction,
unilateral sanctions and counter-measures) and to practical
enforcement problems (e.g., in the case of information-gath-
ering abroad and foreign "blocking legislation").
-Developing countries in particular risk being subject to an-
ticompetitive practices (e.g., use of intellectual property
rights for limiting domestic competition) and extraterritorial
application of other countries' competition laws.
-WTO law should deal more systematically with the ac-
knowledged risk that GATT and GATS commitments may
be undermined by private anticompetitive practices.
The integration of trade and competition rules in EC law, and the
acceptance of the EC competition law principles by more than twenty-
five European countries, offer important lessons for overcoming the
limits to present international cooperation in the field of competition.
These lessons are, in part, similar to those from the integrated trade
and competition rules in the regional free-trade area agreements be-
tween Australia and New Zealand, as well as within the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Area. 12 For instance:
-EC competition rules coexist with national competition
rules in all EC member states and are applied through in-
tense cooperation between EC and national competition au-
thorities (e.g., exchange of confidential information, agreed
allocation of jurisdiction to initiate and carry out investiga-
tions, cooperation within the Advisory Committees on Re-
strictive Practices, Dominant Positions and Merger Control)
and through application of EC competition law by EC and
national courts.
-The Agreement on the European Economic Area ("EEA")
and the EC's cooperation agreements with Central and East
European countries, as well as with Russia and the Ukraine,
include both substantive competition rules and procedures
for cooperation among competition authorities. The EC in-
tends to include similar competition rules and procedures
into the "new generation" of association agreements with
Mediterranean countries. These arrangements (e.g., on sub-
stantive minimum standards, information exchange and co-
12. For a comparative survey of international agreements containing competition rules see
ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, COMPETITION ELEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
(1994).
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operation among competition authorities) could serve as a
model for additional cooperation agreements with countries
outside Europe.
-The notification, cooperation, and coordination require-
ments, notably those regarding "positive comity" (Article V)
and "negative comity" (Article VI), in the 1991/1995 EC-
U.S. Agreement on cooperation in the field of competition
policy could serve as a model for similar agreements with
other countries outside Europe (cf the draft EC-Canada
agreement). Yet, the number, contents, and actual applica-
tion of bilateral antitrust cooperation agreements and bilat-
eral legal assistance agreements remain limited. For instance,
there are no effective procedures for the settlement of dis-
putes over private anticompetitive practices. The 1986
OECD Recommendations on cooperation between member
countries on restrictive business practices affecting interna-
tional trade are widely regarded as inadequate.
The Report makes a number of recommendations for improving
international cooperation on, and enforcement of, competition rules
through a Plurilateral Agreement on Competition and Trade
("PACT"):
(a) A worldwide competition code, providing also for an in-
ternational competition authority responsible for its imple-
mentation, is not a politically realistic short or medium-term
option. Bilateral cooperation remains essential for detecting
and limiting restrictive practices with transnational effects,
and for preventing or settling conflicts resulting from the ex-
traterritorial enforcement of national competition laws. Both
the "negative comity" and "positive comity" mechanisms can
contribute to a more effective enforcement of competition
rules and should be strengthened and extended to other
countries (e.g., Japan). However, bilateral agreements can-
not replace the need for multilateral substantive minimum
competition rules and dispute settlement procedures so as to
contain, e.g., the risks of commercial frictions resulting from
the absence, ineffectiveness or heterogeneity of national
competition rules.
(b) The proposed PACT should be open to all countries and,
in its initial phase, should include at least the OECD coun-
tries, the central and eastern European countries, as well as
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major trading countries in Asia. It could have the legal status
of a "plurilateral agreement" in terms of Annex 4 to the
Agreement Establishing the WTO so as to make the trade
and competition rules, notably their interpretation and judi-
cial enforcement, mutually supportive. It should be based on
three sets of rules:
(aa) Procedural notification, cooperation, "negative com-
ity" and "positive comity" obligations, as recognized,
e.g., in the EC-U.S. agreement, which could be multi-
lateralized and possibly extended (e.g., by enabling the
exchange of confidential information and by strengthen-
ing the positive comity obligations).
(bb) A limited number of substantive minimum princi-
ples for cross-border cases to be incorporated into the
national laws of member countries in much the same
way as have been the EC Directives (i.e., obligations to
achieve a certain result, without need for amending ex-
isting legislation if it already contains these principles or
is open to similar interpretation). The common princi-
ples could include a prohibition of horizontal cartels re-
lating to the fixing of prices, restriction of supply, or the
sharing of markets, including a prohibition of export
cartels. "Rules of reason" could be provided for other
types of cooperation agreements and vertical restraints,
on whose pro- and anticompetitive effects opinions may
differ depending on the circumstances; one solution
might be to prohibit agreements where their restrictive
effect on competition is not offset by an advantage for
the consumer and/or where they constitute a barrier to
market access. As regards abusive behaviour of enter-
prises in a dominant position, a rule similar to Article 86
of the EC Treaty could be appropriate. In the field of
mergers, priority should be given to a harmonization of
procedures to give competition authorities sufficient
time to consult each other. GATT Article XVII on state
trading enterprises should be strengthened by subjecting
monopolies and companies with "exclusive or special
privileges" to the same competition rules as other com-
mercial enterprises. In addition, the complementarity of
trade and competition policies could be enhanced by in-
clusion of a provision by which the "nullification or im-
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pairment"-through private practices-of market access
commitments under WTO law would be actionable, un-
less appropriate corrective measures are taken by the
country concerned.
(cc) An international institutional structure should be en-
trusted with 3 functions:
-to serve as a forum for analyzing, reviewing and in fu-
ture, possibly, adapting and extending the common
principles, covering all aspects of the relationships be-
tween competition and trade;
-to establish a "register of anticompetitive practices"
within the contracting parties to the agreement; and
-to provide effective international dispute settlement and
enforcement procedures for disputes among member
countries over the international procedural obligations,
per-se-prohibitions, rules of reason, as well as disputes
over "nullification or impairment" of market access as
a result of anticompetitive practices.
C. The 1993 Draft International Antitrust Code ("DIAC") as a
Plurilateral Trade Agreement in Terms of Annex 4 of the
WTO Agreement
The DIAC was elaborated by a private group of academic experts
and practitioners and was submitted to GATT and to the press in July
1993.13 Its authors shared the belief that, even though political consen-
sus on such detailed antitrust provisions may now seem utopian, an
ambitious academic model agreement can assist in stimulating world-
wide reflection and debate on the need for international competition
rules. The proposal to include the international competition rules as a
"Plurilateral Trade Agreement" into WTO law was motivated by the
concern that even if membership in a DIAC may be limited in the
beginning, the agreement must take into account the interrelation-
ships between competition rules and WTO rules on trade in goods,
services, intellectual property rights, surveillance, dispute settlement,
13. The private "International Antitrust Code Working Group" was composed of J. Drexl,
W. Fikentscher, E.M. Fox, A. Fuchs, A. Heinemann, U. Immenga, H.P. Kunz-Hallstein, E.U.
Petersmann, W.R. Schluep, A. Shoda, S.J. Soltysinski, and L.A. Sullivan. The text, introductory
explanation, and detailed comments on this Code have been published in various sources. See,
e.g., W. FIKENTSCHER & U. IMMENGA, DRAFT INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST CODE (1995);
HAUSER, supra note *, at 310-25; WORLD TRADE MATERIALS 126-96 (1995); International Anti-
trust Code Will Be Studied by GATT Members, 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628,
at 259 (Aug. 19, 1993).
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and enforcement. The basic principles underlying the DIAC are in
part similar to those of GAIT law:
(a) International minimum standards for transborder cases
based on the three pillars underlying most modem competi-
tion laws: per se prohibitions and rules of reason with rebut-
table presumptions for horizontal and vertical restraints of
competition (such as cartels and exclusionary distribution
strategies); control of mergers; and control of abuses of mar-
ket power. The minimum standard principle would allow
stricter and divergent national competition laws and experi-
mentation, e.g., in the balancing of the costs and benefits of
restraints of competition, or regarding exceptions for
"concentrations."
(b) Incorporation of the international rules into domestic
laws and their enforcement primarily through domestic com-
petition authorities and courts.
(c) National treatment in the sense that domestic competi-
tion laws applicable to national antitrust cases must be ap-
plied immediately and unconditionally to all interstate
antitrust cases within the scope of the DIAC (e.g., no exemp-
tion of export cartels from domestic cartel prohibitions).
(d) Supervision of the effective enforcement of domestic
competition laws by an independent "International Antitrust
Authority" ("IAA") entitled to request domestic competi-
tion authorities and courts to initiate antitrust investigations
("principle of international procedural initiative"). 14
(e) Intergovernmental dispute settlement proceedings before
an "International Antitrust Panel" between "injured" and
"injuring countries," or between the IAA and a member
country which violates its obligations under the DIAC, ac-
cording to the WTO dispute settlement procedures.
(f) Integration of the DIAC into the WTO world trade and
legal system as a "Plurilateral Trade Agreement" in the sense
of Annex 4 to the WTO Agreement. This would facilitate the
14. The establishment of such an International Antitrust Authority is one of the major dif-
ferences between the DIAC and the recommendations of the EC Expert Group Report, which
"does not consider this a realistic short or medium-term option." FIKENTSCHER, supra note 13,
at 18. The establishment of an "International Competition Policy Office" within the WTO, al-
beit with less powers, has also been proposed. See F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR
AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (1994).
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progressive extension of the initially limited membership to
other WTO member countries, as well as take into account
many interface problems of trade and competition rules in
the field of goods trade, services trade, intellectual property
rights, and foreign investments.' 5
V. SYSTEMIC ADVANTAGES OF INTEGRATING COMPETITION RULES
INTO GATT/WTO LAW: THE CASE FOR REFORMING
ANTIDUMPING LAW
A. Inconsistencies Between Anti-dumping Laws and Competition
Laws
Antidumping laws and GATT rules define dumping either as in-
ternational price discrimination (home market price - export price =
dumping margin) or as sales below full costs (including averaged pro-
duction costs, general and administrative expenses, and a reasonable
profit).' 6 Since the introduction of the first antidumping laws in Can-
ada (1905), New Zealand (1905), Australia (1906), the United States
(1916, 1921) and Great Britain (1921), import-competing industries
have attempted to justify antidumping measures on various grounds of
antitrust policy (e.g., risk of monopolization through predatory pric-
ing), trade protection (e.g., of "strategic industries") or unfairness
(e.g., of protected export markets enabling supra-competitive profits
and cross-subsidization of exports). However, there is broad agree-
ment among economists that none of these reasons is convincing, 17
and that antidumping laws distort international trade in an arbitray
and welfare-reducing manner. 18 For instance:
15. For a critical discussion of the DIAC see HAUSER, supra note *
16. Both definitions of dumping refer to actual home market prices or actual costs of for-
eign firms and not to regulatory differences between high-standards countries and low-standards
countries. They do therefore not apply to "eco-dumping" or "social dumping," which refer not to
actual international price discrimination or below cost sales by foreign firms, but to allegedly
unfair "regulatory subsidies" resulting from lax environmental or labour standards in the export-
ing country which do not fully reflect all social costs and may confer unfair cost advantages to
producers in low-standards countries.
17. See J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1923); For more re-
cent critical studies see ANTIDUMPING: HOW IT WORKS AND WHO GETS HURT (J. Michael Fin-
ger ed., 1993); RICHARD DALE, ANTIDUMPING LAW IN A LIBERAL TRADE ORDER (1980); DOWN
IN THE DuMps: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAWS (Richard Boltuck & Robert E.
Litan eds., 1991); B.M. HOEKMAN & P.C. MAVROIDIS, ANTI-TRUST BASED REMEDIES AND
DUMPING IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1994); R.E. SCHONE, ALTERNATIVES TO ANTIDUMPING
FROM AN ANTITRUST PERSPECIVE (1996).
18. This was confirmed in two recent empirical studies by the United States International
Trade Commission. See UNITED STATES INT'L TRADE COMM'N, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY ORDERS AND SUSPENSION AGREEMENTS, No.332-
344 (June 1995) and by the OECD (a 1995 expert report prepared by Prof. Willig and Prof.
Messerlin, not yet published).
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(a) As a means to protect import-competing industries
against predatory pricing by foreign exporters, antidumping
laws are inconsistent with antitrust laws (e.g., in the EC and
United States) and go far beyond what might be necessary.
Thus, antitrust laws in the EC and the United States are not
concerned at discriminatory low-pricing as such. Selling be-
low costs is considered to be prohibited by EC competition
law only if a dominant firm (a) sold below average variable
costs, which is considered per se abusive and illegal, or (b) it
sold below average total costs with the intent to drive a com-
petitor from the market.19 U.S. antitrust law tends to con-
sider below cost sales to be illegal only if the alleged
predator has a dominant position and is able to recoup its
losses made during the "predatory pricing" period so that
competition risks becoming monopolized. 20
Antidumping laws are inconsistent with these antitrust
aims: (a) they protect import-competing industries rather
19. EC competition law does not expressly prohibit price discrimination or dumping per se.
Article 86 of the EC Treaty only prohibits the abuse of a dominant position in the EC if it affects
trade between EC member states. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
["EEC TREATY"] art. 86. Article 86 has been applied to price discrimination and below cost
sales if a dominant position enables a firm (or, in case of a collective dominant position, several
firms) to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ulti-
mately of consumers. A market share above about 50% accounts as such for a dominant market
position. Cf. Case 62/86, Akzo Chemiev v. Commission of the European Communities, 1991
E.C.R. 3359, 3453 (1991). However, the prohibition in Article 86(c) of "applying dissimilar con-
ditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competi-
tive disadvantage," has been applied only to discriminatory high prices to manufacturers,
retailers, or distributors, but not to discriminatory high pricing to consumers, price discrimina-
tion between national markets as such, nor to discriminatory low pricing. Selling below costs has
been considered an abuse prohibited by Article 86 only in two cases. See Akzo, 1991 E.C.R.
3359; Commission Decision of 18 July 1988 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 86 of the
EEC Treaty; Napier Brown v. British Sugar, 1988 O.J. (L 284/41). The prohibitions were based
upon (a) a price-cost comparison (e.g., prices below total costs, but above average variable costs,
by the dominant firm Akzo); and (b) the intention of the dumper to drive its competitors from
the market. In Akzo, the EC Court considered only prices below average variable costs as abu-
sive and illegal per se and not justifiable by reasons other than the intent to harm competitors.
See Akzo, 1991 E.C.R. 3359. For a comparison of EC and U.S. antidumping and antitrust poli-
cies see SCHONE, supra note 17.
20. In A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989), for
instance, the court held it was irrelevant that sales were below costs and that the predator's
intent was to ruin its competitor. The court affirmed the dismissal of the case on the ground that
it was impossible for the predator firm to recoup its losses by subsequent monopoly prices. See
id. The impossiblity of regaining losses was also discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Matsu-
shita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), which was part of a series
of antidumping, countervailing duty, and antitrust complaints by U.S. television manufacturers
competing with Japanese television manufacturers. For detailed references to this U.S. antitrust
law case see SCHONE, supra note 17.
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than competition; 21 (b) they use much laxer standards facili-
tating findings of "dumping" and "like products," in contrast
to the strict antitrust standards for determing "predatory
pricing" and the "relevant markets;" (c) antidumping reme-
dies (import duties, price undertakings, or quantitative ex-
port restraints) often restrict all imports of like products
from the country concerned without being limited to investi-
gated firms (in contrast to the prohibitions, cease and desist
orders, fines, criminal sanctions, and civil damages of anti-
trust laws). As a result of these and other protectionist biases
in antidumping laws, most antidumping measures are im-
posed by the EC and the United States under conditions
(e.g., small market shares of exporters accused of dumping)
which would never justify an antitrust remedy against "pred-
atory pricing." The welfare-reducing consequences for do-
mestic consumers, downstream user industries, and
competition of this discrimination in favour of "rent-seek-
ing" producers are essentially arbitrary.
(b) As a means to protect import-competing producers
against low-priced imports, the stricter substantive and pro-
cedural conditions in the WTO Agreement on Safeguard
Measures pursuant to GATT Article XIX (e.g., nondiscrimi-
nation requirement so as to avoid trade diversion, public in-
terest requirement taking into account consumer interests,
transparency requirement, stricter time limits and degressiv-
ity of safeguard measures) should be applied in a nondis-
criminatory manner to all domestic producers seeking
protection against injury caused by import competition. This
would also protect more effectively the balance of rights and
obligations under GATT law (e.g., the obligations under Ar-
21. There seem to be only three cases where EC antidumping decisions were based on
antitrust considerations: Council Regulation (EEC) no. 2322/85 of 12 August 1985 Imposing a
Definitive Anti-dumping Duty on Imports of Glycine originating in Japan, 1985 O.J. (L 218/1) 1
(the Council limited the antidumping duty to less than the dumping margin so as not to give
monopoly power to the single EC producer by eliminating foreign competition completely);
Commission Decision of 10 January 1994 Terminating the Anti-Dumping Proceeding Concern-
ing Imports of Gum Rosin Originating in the People's Republic of China, 1994 O.J. (L 41/50) 50
(the EC Commission discontinued the proceeding since the complainant EC industry would not
have been able to supply the demand without significant price increases); Case 358/89, Extramet
Industrie SA v. Council of the European Communities, 1992 E.C.R. 3813 (the EC Court found
the EC antidumping duties illegal because the EC Commission had failed to take into account
the anticompetitive refusal of the petitioner Pechiney, the single EC producer of calcium metal,
to supply calcium metal to the processor of calcium metal, Extramet).
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ticles XIX and XXVIII to grant compensation for the with-
drawal of concessions, or to face reciprocal withdrawal of
concessions by the exporting country). Again, the discrimina-
tory and protectionist nature of antidumping measures,
which are easily renewable and not progressively liberalized,
lack any justification.
(c) As a means to put pressure on exporting countries to lib-
eralize their markets to prevent international market seg-
mentation and "level the playing field," antidumping
measures are suboptimal compared to alternative policy in-
struments which remedy the causes of dumping directly at
their source. For instance, reciprocal liberalization of govern-
mental market access barriers, and antitrust enforcement
against private anticompetitive practices in both the export-
ing and the importing country, offer welfare-increasing and
more equitable alternative instruments of curing the roots of
international market segmentation and of rendering "mono-
polizing dumping" impossible. As explained above, the ques-
tion of whether the production conditions in the exporting
country are "fair" is irrelevant for the economic welfare of
the importing country, provided there are no nonfinancial in-
ternational externalities to the detriment of the importing
country.
B. How to Reform Antidumping Laws?
Economic theory suggests that, among the various objectives of
antidumping policies, only "monopolizing dumping" deserves action
against foreign exporters; but such action should be based on the same
antitrust standards applied to predatory pricing by domestic firms.
Moreover, empirical evidence demonstrates that, in the modern glob-
ally-integrated world economy, there seems to be no documented in-
stance of "monopolizing dumping" where the losses could be
recouped by later monopoly profits.22 If monopolizing predatory pric-
ing should actually occur, enforcement of antitrust rules in the import-
ing and exporting country concerned, and liberalization of
governmental market access barriers to enable "arbitrage" and to
render "monopoly prices" impossible, offer more efficent policy alter-
natives than antidumping laws. As convincingly shown by Schbne,
22. See UNITED STATES INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 18; ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PREDATORY PRICING (1989).
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"neither international substantial harmonization of predatory pricing
standards nor an international antitrust authority are required to con-
trol predatory pricing practices in international trade; '23 an interna-
tional agreement on cooperation between antitrust authorities could,
however, help in the collection of evidence, and in the enforcement of
antitrust decisions, in the exporting country concerned.
Reform of antidumping laws will be beneficial to consumers, the
national economies at large, and also the legal consistency, trans-
parency, and effectiveness of national and international trade laws.
But it will hurt the powerful import-competing industries (such as the
U.S. steel lobbies) which currently benefit from the "protection rents"
made possible by antidumping measures. Antidumping bureaucracies
have also vested self-interests in maintaining their "antidumping em-
pires" and do not care that "the emperor has no clothes. ' 24 Individual
consumers and the citizens at large tend to act "rationally ignorant"
towards the price increases and welfare losses caused by antidumping
measures in a manner which is neither transparent nor understandable
to the ordinary citizen. Also, export industries in the main "user coun-
tries" of antidumping measures (i.e., Australia, Canada, the EC and
the United States) see no sufficient advantage in supporting reforms
of antidumping laws as long as they suffer less from antidumping
measures than many of their competitors (e.g., Japanese and other
Asian export industries). For political reasons, unilateral antidumping
reform is therefore unlikely. The experience with the 1979 GATF An-
tidumping Code and the 1994 WTO Antidumping Code suggests that
reforms of international antidumping rules through international ne-
gotiations in GAT[ and the WTO among self-interested antidumping
bureaucracies may produce only few procedural improvements.
Reform of the arbitrary substantive antidumping rules might
therefore be politically achievable only as part of a broader "package
deal negotiation." Notably developing countries should learn from
their relatively less successful negotiation strategies in the Tokyo
23. See SCHONE, supra note 17, at 172. Enforcement of national antitrust law in the import-
ing country against dumped imports is not likely to produce any adverse effects on competition
in the exporting country if markets are segmented. As the diverging national antitrust ap-
proaches toward predatory pricing help to discover the most efficient rules, control of dumping
in international trade does not require substantial harmonization of national predatory pricing
rules. National antitrust authorities in the importing countries can apply national antitrust laws
according to the "effects doctrine" or "territoriality principle" to predatory pricing strategies
that may harm competition in the importing country and are carried out within the territory of
the importing country.
24. See N. David Palmeter, The Antidumping Emperor, 22 J. WORLD TRADE, August 1988,
at 5, 5-7 (1988).
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Round and Uruguay Round negotiations such as those regarding on
liberalization of agricultural and textiles trade. In order to be more
successful, reforms of antidumping rules must be made an agenda
item of future "WTO Rounds" subject to a number of conditions such
as:
(a) The current proposals for negotiating additional WTO
rules on trade-related investment measures, environmental,
social, and antitrust rules all have an important "competition
dimension"; 25 they should therefore be linked to reforms of
antidumping rules as a condicio sine qua non. If announced
at an early time, such a negotiating position could become a
"credible threat" to the success of future WTO Rounds. As
substantial reforms of antidumping laws will require many
years of negotiations, and may be achieved only step-by-step,
parallel progress on these various agenda items of the future
WTO Round should become a negotiating principle.
(b) Reform of antidumping rules will not be politically possi-
ble without the strong support from export industries in the
EC and the United States. In order to build up such support,
other trading countries may have to use "carrots" (e.g., liber-
alization of governmental market access barriers and en-
forcement of competition rules against private market access
barriers to prevent market segmentation as one precondition
for dumping) as well as "sticks" (e.g., reciprocal use of an-
tidumping laws against EC and U.S. exporters).
(c) Abolition of antidumping rules has so far only been
achieved as part of common markets (notably in the EC and
the European Economic Area) or free trade areas with har-
monized competition laws (notably in the Australia-New
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement). This con-
firms that the complete abolishment of antidumping rules
will not be possible in one big bang. Further trade liberaliza-
25. While this "competition dimension" is obvious for trade-related investment measures
(such as purchase or export requirements) and trade-related environmental measures (such as
environmental subsidies, packaging regulations, private deposit-and-return systems, or other
waste disposal arrangements), proposals for enforcing ILO prohibitions of forced labour, child
labour, or of discrimination against women through the more effective WTO dispute settlement
system, rather than through the ILO dispute settlement procedures, are mainly motivated by
social rather than competitive concerns. But a "social clause" linking trade rules and trade
union rights could raise doubts whether labour laws mandating collective bargaining and "closed
shops" are consistent with market-determined bargaining processes.
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tion and harmonization of competition laws seem to be polit-
ical preconditions for reforming antidumping laws.
(d) Gradual reforms of GATIWTO antidumping rules
should focus on the inclusion of antitrust criteria, 26 such as: a
preceding antitrust investigation by the antitrust authorities
of both the importing and the exporting country into an-
ticompetitive conduct of the dumper in the export and im-
port markets; a preceding antitrust examination of the
dumper's dominant market position based on an antitrust
definition of the relevant market (which, contrary to the
"like product concept" of antidumping law, also takes into
account the consumer perspective and the substitutability of
products) and on a new de minimis rule regarding the neces-
sary minimum market share of the alleged dumpers; a re-
form of the protectionist "injury concept" of antidumping
laws by taking into account the "public interest" and "injury
to competition" as a whole (rather than only injury to the
import-competing industry, including loss of their monopoly
rents as a result of import competition); procedural reforms
such as giving all affected groups legal standing in antidump-
ing investigations and access to judicial review.
VI. MAIN POLICY CONCLUSION: LINKING NEGOTIATIONS ON
COMPETITION, INVESTMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND
ANTIDUMPING RULES IN THE NEXT WTO
ROUND
The preceding analysis leads to two major policy
recommendations:
A. Need for Promoting More Consistent WTO Rules on Private
Restraints of Competition Through a WTO Committee on
Trade and Competition
For legal and political reasons, the existing "protectionist biases"
in trade and competition laws (such as anticompetitive antidumping
practices, exemptions for export and import cartels)-and the lack of
competition rules in the GATS (e.g., for monopolistic service suppli-
ers), in intellectual property conventions (e.g., for patent misuse) and
also at the national level in many less-developed countries-can be
26. This has been convincingly shown by SCHONE, supra note 17, at 163; see also HOEKMAN,
supra note 17, at 23.
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overcome best by negotiating additional competition rules as part of
the GATT/WTO world trade and legal system. The WTO Ministerial
Conference in December 1996 at Singapore should, inter alia, estab-
lish a WTO Committee on Trade and Competition with the task of
identifying interface problems of governmental and private market ac-
cess barriers and distortions. On the basis of such preparatory work
and "consensus-building," a future "WTO Round" should include ne-
gotiations on supplementing the existing GATI', GATS, TRIPS, and
TRIMS disciplines by additional competition rules on trade-related
private market access barriers and distortions. As worldwide consen-
sus among WTO member countries on worldwide competition rules
may be difficult to achieve, a second-best option would be to negotiate
a "Plurilateral Agreement on Trade and Competition," in terms of
Annex 4 to the WTO Agreement, with substantive and procedural
minimum standards for domestic competition laws and policies re-
garding trade-related private market access barriers and market dis-
tortions. The scope and membership of such a PACT among
interested WTO member countries could be progressively extended
over time.
B. Need for Linking Future WTO Negotiations on Investment,
Competition and Environmental Rules to Reforms of
Antidumping Laws
The various proposals for additional WTO rules on competition,
investment, environmental, social, and labour standards are different
aspects of a general "integration problem" which has long been dis-
cussed in the context of European integration: To what extent do the
regulatory differences among national legal and economic systems re-
flect market failures or government failures? Should such failures,
provided they can be objectively defined, be corrected through multi-
lateral international minimum standards, bilateral agreements (e.g., on
mutual recognition of equivalent standards), unilateral safeguard
measures discriminating against foreign products, nondiscriminatory
"border adjustment measures" by import and/or export countries with-
out regard to the origin of products, or through "competition among
rules" and democratic "voting by feet"? How can the "prisoner di-
lemma," "free riding," and other impediments to mutually beneficial
international cooperation be overcome?
Economic theory suggests that "competition among rules" may
lead to suboptimal results in the case of transnational "externalities"
and "international public goods." But these imperfections of "regula-
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tory competition" must be weighed against the risks of intergovern-
mental harmonization and government failures. Liberal international
trade is-from the perspective of consumer welfare, economic effi-
ciency and individual liberty-a mutually beneficial "international
public good" that is no less important than other international public
goods (such as internationally agreed minimum standards for animal
and plant protection). Public-choice theory teaches that the necessary
political support for providing international public goods (such as in-
ternational minimum standards for environmental, labour, and invest-
ment protection) will depend on reciprocal "package deal
negotiations"; they are likely to succeed only if they offer "carrots" for
joining international agreements on the supply of international public
goods, as well as "sticks" for the "free-riders."
The positive experience of the Uruguay Round negotiations-as
well as the negative experiences of, e.g., UNCTAD, WIPO, and the
OECD with negotiations on enforceable international competition
rules-suggest that such "package negotiations" on multilateral mini-
mum standards for environmental, social and investment rules might
be more successful if carried out in the framework of the WTO.
Hence, contrary to the economic efficiency arguments in favour of
separating economic policy instruments, there are political arguments
for "package deal negotiations" in the WTO on trade, competition,
investment, environmental, and labour rules. Such negotiations should
be linked to reforms of antidumping rules which impede and distort
international trade and risk to undermine the liberal WTO world
trade and legal system. Progressive reforms of antidumping rules
should become an agenda item of all future WTO Rounds and should
focus on reconciling antidumping rules with antitrust treatment of
predatory pricing practices. The progressive inclusion of antitrust cri-
teria into WTO antidumping law should be made a condition for pro-
gress in future WTO negotiations on additional WTO investment,
competition, and environmental rules.
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